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DoD Urges Continuation Of Foreign Military Sales

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 24 and made the following statement in support of Foreign Military Sales for Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971:

During this past year, there was a major change in the direction of our national security policy. In his Feb. 18, 1970 Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy, President Nixon cited the following three principles as major elements of that change:

"The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

"We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

"In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."

In his State of the Union Message, the President also stated:

"The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being."

These principles have become known as the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine places the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in a special position in our foreign policy. It is now more important than ever that these two instruments of U.S. policy be put to optimum use in helping to reduce both the monetary and the manpower burden we now carry in honoring international obligations.

I believe that the best hope of reducing our overseas involvements and expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly nations to do even more than they are now doing in their own defense. To realize that hope, however, requires that we must continue, if requested, to give or sell them the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them to assume.

That is why, in the interest of maintaining an adequate

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Vice Admiral Blouin

Admiral Blouin Explains Structure, Role Of National Security Council

Vice Admiral Francis J. Blouin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), addressed the San Diego (Calif.) Council of the Navy League March 23. He discussed the function and organization of the National Security Council. Below are excerpts of his remarks:

My responsibilities as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy engage me in intimate work within the national security system. My primary responsibility is to assist the Chief of Naval Operations on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters pertaining to the command of the operating forces and to military-political affairs.

As we enter a new decade there is a dramatic churning of events within our country which is having great impact on policy. New courses are being set within the new and often charged atmosphere of changing national priorities:

—Attitudinal changes have occurred throughout the land

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DoD Urges Continuation Of Foreign Military Sales

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defense posture at minimum cost, the growing use of credit-assisted sales of military equipment, as well as increased MAP, seem clearly indicated for the immediate future.

There are, of course, certain cases—Turkey and Korea, for example—which call for continuing provision of substantial grant aid under MAP. Fortunately, there is also an increasing number of countries whose economic condition now permits them to make purchases which vary from modest amounts to virtually all of the military equipment they need. When they are willing and able to do so, when the sale is consistent with our national interest, and we are satisfied that their requirements are completely valid ones which can be met without increasing regional tensions or fostering arms races, it is clearly in our mutual best interests for the United States to make the sale.

These considerations in other circumstances may result in a situation where it may be mutually beneficial for the United States to provide credit under FMS when the prospective purchasing nation cannot pay cash without jeopardizing its economic posture or progress, and thus actually degrading the security it is trying to strengthen.

It is to prevent such a self-defeating exercise that the Administration requests authority to extend up to $350 million in credit during FY 70 and appropriation of $275 million in new obligational authority for the aggregate of credit and guaranties. For FY 71, the comparable amounts requested are an authority of $385 million and an appropriation of $272.5 million.

Availability of such authority and appropriations will enable the Administration to make optimum use of Foreign Military Sales both to compensate for reduced grant aid under MAP and as a twin instrument which complements MAP in promoting national defense and foreign policy.

The importance of FMS credit is underscored by the fact that it facilitates the maintenance of a credible deterrent to military pressure—external or internal—against countries in which we have vital security interests at minimum cost to the U.S. taxpayer. Nations such as the Republic of China, Iran and Korea cannot at this time make the immediate cash outlays needed to buy the military equipment we and they consider essential to protect our mutual security interests; and they cannot obtain the necessary credit unless it is provided or guaranteed by the U.S. Government. Our assistance makes it possible to amortize the cost of military purchases over several years and thus, in the long run, permit them to pay for a growing portion of their defense requirements without undue burden on their developing economies.

Several of the forward defense countries which are in close proximity to aggressive or belligerent Communist neighbors, and whose Armed Forces therefore represent a substantial segment of the deterrent we consider necessary in such strategically vulnerable areas, have embarked on multi-year modernization programs predicated on the continuing availability of credit from the United States. Clearly, it is very much in our own self-interest that they proceed with such



Deputy Secretary Packard

programs in order to establish and maintain the military strength they need to provide for their own defense. It is equally to our advantage that they are willing to assume the cost of modernizing their forces if they can get credit which enables them to pay for their purchases on terms compatible with their financial capabilities. Failure on our part to make that credit available would seriously disrupt the very programs we have urged them to undertake in our common interest.

A substantial part—30 per cent approximately in FY 70 and an estimated 20 per cent in FY 71—of military export sales, which run between $1.5 billion and $2 billion annually, is made by U.S. industry directly to foreign governments. The Department of Defense is not directly involved in the negotiating or implementing of such transactions which, like all exports of arms from the United States, must be approved and licensed by the Department of State. The Office of Munitions Control at State is responsible for insuring that all licenses issued are consistent with U.S. security and foreign policy, and we work very closely with that office in evaluating applications. Although we encourage this type of direct industry-to-foreign government transactions, it is not practical in the majority of cases. Inhibiting factors include the small quantities required, inability of the purchasing country always to deal prudently on a direct basis, and requirements which can be met on a timely basis only through purchase from the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, we hope to see sales of this sort increasing in the future and we are seeking practical ways to facilitate them.

The greater part of the $2 billion annual FMS total represents sales to the developed and industrialized countries such as those of Western Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia and a few oil-rich nations in the Middle

DoD's Project 100,000 Reduces Reliance On Draft

A reduced and more equitable draft has resulted from the Defense Department's 41-month-old Project 100,000.

The program, designed to provide young men previously disqualified for military service an opportunity to make the grade as fully satisfactory servicemen, has accomplished the following:

1—It has increased the number of voluntary enlistments, thereby reducing reliance on the draft.

2—It has improved the equality of the draft by qualifying men who can perform successfully in a variety of military jobs.

In late 1969, Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, presented a progress report on the program to the subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

He said he had personally checked the progress of Project 100,000 entrants in recruit training and found their records encouraging.

"The per cent of Project 100,000 entrants who complete their recruit training runs about 95 per cent," he said, "against 98 per cent for others."

He said the performance of these men after completing basic training is generally satisfactory, adding:

"I have discussed the performance of these men with military commanders, and the consensus is that the quality of military performance is not being eroded because of the inclusion of Project 100,000 people in the Armed Forces. . . . I would categorize it as a tentative success because there are some professional studies which are under way now which will report more precisely on the success of the program. . . ."

So far 260,000 "New Standards" men have been accepted during the program which has been in existence since 1966.

At that time the Defense Department revised entrance standards for military service and began accepting men who would have been disqualified in the past because of failure to meet the mental standards and for physical defects which are easily correctable. Those men accepted into the program are now identified as "New Standards" men.

The thinking behind the program was to operate the armed forces with a cross-section of American youth, but still rejecting those who score in the lower 10 per cent on the mental tests.

As long as the draft is operating there is an obligation to try and take as many as possible by voluntary enlistment.

"By excluding people who are interested in enlisting and can perform adequately," Mr. Kelley explained, "we increase the number who have to be drafted. We also lowered draft standards in order to improve equity. When we make a decision that some young are not fit to serve, we automatically shift the burden of service to other people."

"We want to stress that we are very aware of our responsibility in managing this program in a manner which protects the effectiveness of our military units," he said. "For this reason performance standards for graduating courses or remaining in service have not been lowered."

"We have tried to take in the kind of men who we think will

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East. We estimate that, for FY 70, 80 per cent of total sales will be made to these countries and, for FY 71, 73 per cent. The trend, however, is slowly downward as many of these countries expand and improve their own production bases and are thus increasingly capable of supplying not only their own needs but some of third countries. The percentage of sales in comparison with grant aid to lesser developed countries has risen slowly over the past few years. This is an indication of the improvement in the economies of these countries which enables them to pay for a growing share of their defense needs.

All our Foreign Military Sales activities are rigidly controlled to insure that they are fully consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests. They are guided by two basic principles. First, we respond to the foreign country's initiatives; and our sales offers are made in answer to the prospective purchaser's inquiry or request. Secondly, we want to sell only what we are firmly convinced the foreign country really needs and can afford.

As Secretary of Defense Laird and others have stated in earlier testimony before this Committee, these principles stem from the will of the Congress as embodied in the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 and are incorporated in various orders and directives promulgated by the Executive Branch to insure that all sales approved and consummated are fully consistent with both the law and our national interest.

Credit is extended only after the Treasury Department and the Departments of State and Defense have completed a most careful review of the requirement itself, the country's economic and financial capabilities and repayment terms. If there is any doubt about the country's credit worthiness, no offer is made. Details of the transaction include (1) items to be sold, (2) the amount of credit to be made available and (3) the terms of repayment, all of which are set forth in a written government-to-government arrangement covering each transaction. Credit terms are in strict accord with standards and criteria prescribed by Section 34 of the Act.

Apart from the obvious changes in dollar amounts and fiscal years, the bill you are considering is identical with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 except for subsection (b) of Section 3. The Administration proposes to broaden the President's authority to waive the prohibition on sales credits or guaranties to countries which seize, take into custody or fine American fishing vessels by adding after "when he determines it to be important to the security of the United States," the following: ". . . or he received reasonable assurances from the country involved that future violations will not occur." I believe this additional latitude is necessary to provide the President with adequate flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy, and I urge your favorable consideration of the proposed change.

Asia In The 1970s

In the past two decades, the nations of Southeast Asia have grown economically and politically. The future growth—and the role of these nations in the growth of the region in the 1970s—was the subject of a recent address by the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Following are excerpts from his address.



It is a rash person . . . who would venture to predict what is going to happen in any area during the next decade; but, given the record of those who have in the past prophesied on Asia, it is perhaps even more foolhardy to try to predict what is going to happen there during the decade of the 70s.

This is a vast region of infinite variety, including the largest country in the world and some of the smaller ones. The population is enormous. The resources are great. The problems also are great.

National Ferment

It is a region of tremendous diversity, of different traditions and cultures, and of varying degrees of economic and political development, and of often conflicting national interests.

Yet, despite these diversities there are certain elements which most of the countries have in common.

Perhaps the most striking is that of ferment, of new ideas, of new aspirations, of the questioning of old values.

We have contributed to this ferment, sometimes even unconsciously. The ideas of our own revolution are ideas which have caught hold of and inspired many in the area.

More recently our shield of strength has helped to protect many of them. Our resources and our technology have aided them in their economic progress.

I am glad to talk about East Asia as a whole because we sometimes tend to get so preoccupied with the problems of Vietnam that we tend to lose sight of the broader perspective of which it is only a part.

A Secure Community

Our basic objective in East Asia, as elsewhere in the world, is the establishment of a peaceful community of nations, each free to choose its own way of government and its own way of life, to develop its resources to the maximum and to have peaceful and productive relations with its neighbors.

We recognize that to develop this kind of a community of nations they must have security. This having been said, and while United States' interests remain essentially the same and our commitments firm, we must recognize that there is undeniably a change in the mood of the American people.

The American people sense that changing conditions bring changing problems and accordingly require changing answers.

What is it that has changed? Economic progress is visible almost everywhere in free Asia. . . .

Goals Gained

Governments are increasingly capable and willing to assume responsibility not only for their own people but in regional matters and in collaboration with their neighbors. They are beginning to help each other.

The most notable case of progress and confidence is . . . Japan, whose 100 million people have a substantially higher total national product than do the 750 million people of Mainland China. As the third greatest industrial producer in the world, Japan has taken her rightful place as one of the great trading and developed nations of the world. Except for Canada, Japan buys more from us and sells to us more than any other country in the world.

Japan has taken a major lead in regional economic cooperation. Her contribution to the Asian Development Bank matches that of the United States. In recent years Japan has greatly enlarged her economic assistance in East Asia, and, in fact, the amount of Japanese economic resources to developing countries exceeded $1 billion in 1968. The Japanese Government has just announced that it expects the amount to be $1.4 billion in 1970.

Lands of Progress

The Republic of Korea, in a brief 17 years, has risen from the ruins of a devastating war, and has developed one of the highest growth rates in the world, and astonishes its visitors by the vitality and confidence of its economic progress.

In the Republic of China on Taiwan, we have seen equally dramatic progress in economic growth. Not only has per capita income doubled in the last 10 years, but the Republic of China is also helping others to help themselves with techni-

cal aid programs in over 20 countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Thailand, a country of crucial importance to the area, has a long tradition of independence and self-reliance. It is making impressive economic progress, combatting insurgency within its own borders, contributing troops to the struggle in South Vietnam, and providing leadership in regional cooperation and organization in Southeast Asia.

Australia and New Zealand, both also prospering economically, have troops fighting by our side in Vietnam.

In addition, they have announced that they intend to maintain troops in Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal from that area in 1971, in fuller recognition of their role as Asian powers.

Our former dependency, the Philippines, is independently developing its own economic and political institutions.

Regional Cooperation

Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand, despite numerous rivalries and difficulties, have been quietly working together for a considerable period on a plan for the development of the valley of the Mekong River for the benefit of the whole region.

One of the most interesting, and in the long run perhaps one of the most potentially significant, developments has been the beginnings . . . of collaboration between the countries of the region in purely Asian terms.

It is against this background of changing circumstances, for the most part changes representing increased capacities, strength, confidence and determination in the area itself, that last year at Guam President Nixon outlined new directions in our policy toward Asia. Welcoming, and encouraged by, these developments in Asia, the President said that he felt the time had now come for the United States to assume less of a predominant and more of a supporting role in the area.

He said that from now on we will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing manpower for its defense, especially for internal defense. While we are prepared to furnish military aid and training, we would not be prepared to assume such defense as a primary or exclusively American undertaking.

The Future Holds . . .?

Given this background, what can we hope for and realistically expect in Asia itself in the 1970s?

It will remain an area of ferment, an area of change, but I also believe generally an area of progress; progress both in those things of concern to the area and those things of concern to us. This involves in particular what is going to happen with respect to Japan; . . . what is going to happen with respect to China, overwhelmingly the most populous country in the world; and Indonesia, the second most populous country in East Asia.

First, with respect to Japan, a country virtually without any natural resources except the genius of its people, its future is going to depend very heavily on whether the Free World economic system remains healthy.

If the Free World economy remains healthy, it is estimated that by the end of the 1970s Japan will have again more than doubled [its] national product and will have reached a per capita income of about $4,200, or equal to ours as of today. Just in terms of our own economic interests, this probably means at least a doubling of our present level of trade, which is presently about $7 billion in both directions.

When Peace Comes

The glass is much darker with respect to Mainland China. The spectacular achievements of the Chinese people in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore well demonstrate what that great people can do, accommodating themselves to the modern world, if given a reasonably rational political and economic environment in which to work. The question with respect to Mainland China is whether the situation there will develop in such a way as to bring about such a system for its own people as well as a system which is willing to live and let live in the international community.

I would hope and expect that with continued support and assistance from the outside that Indonesia would continue to move toward overcoming its monumental problems.

At such a time as peace is established in Vietnam, I am confident that country can achieve a record that will be even more impressive than that that has been made by South Korea. There is no people in Southeast Asia that is more energetic, intelligent and adaptable than the people of Vietnam. And the natural resources of South Vietnam far surpass those of Korea. It is basically a food surplus area and given conditions of reasonable security and stability, will be able quickly to achieve a large degree of economic self-sufficiency.

A Regional Plan

Finally, I turn to the region as a whole. From the standpoint of our interests, the ideal is a community of the Free States of Asia cooperating together for their common interests in political, economic and security fields with which we are associated only to the degree that those states desire our association.

Thus, this is the next decade as I see it in East Asia. It will not be an area from which we will want to divorce ourselves, but rather an area which, in both absolute and relative terms, will be increasingly important to us.

It will not be an area devoid of difficulties and crises which may at times involve our responsibilities and interests, but it will, I am convinced, be an area with which we can and must continue to associate ourselves in ways that take account of the evolution of conditions and events in both the area and our own country.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Admiral Blouin Explains Structure, Role Of National Security Council

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which have caused a general reappraisal of where we are and where we are going.

—Forty per cent of the 1971 Federal Budget is marked for human resource programs. In 1961, only 30 per cent of the budget went to this category. Conversely, the national defense share of the budget has decreased from 48 per cent in 1961 to an estimated 36 per cent in 1971.

—The intense competition for resources in all sectors has made for a new mood in Congress. A mood best described by the question "How much defense is necessary?"

In order to determine just how much *is* necessary, President Nixon's Administration has taken steps to bring the complex and interrelated problems of national security under more systematic review. These steps include:

—Revitalizing the National Security Council and its associated machinery in order to ensure that the President receives all major views and alternatives before reaching a decision.

—Improving the Defense Department's planning-programming and budgeting system.

—Enunciating the United States' foreign policy for the 1970s.

These new steps will affect the lives of all of us here.

The National Security Council traces its origin to the period just after World War II and was established in 1947 as the outgrowth of a real need for a policy-forming and advisory body of top government officials. These officials were intended to assist in making policy in the political and military fields and in coordinating that policy among the executive departments.

The manner in which the past four Presidents have used this body has varied with the individual personality of the incumbent. Each President has shaped the national security system to best suit his needs and methods.

The system at best is a bureaucracy that must run smoothly enough to take care of ordinary problems as a matter of routine, but not be so pervasive as to inhibit the creative thought that is inseparable from true leadership.

An involved system that must be watched closely in order that it might have the best chance for success.

In the past year, the national security system has been formalized to address fundamental issues and plan intelligent action.

At the top is the President. The entire system exists to give him the necessary information, advice, and options to enable him to make the best possible decisions.

The National Security Council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. These statutory members may be supplemented with temporary members if the President so desires. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency serve as permanent advisers to the National Security Council. The administrative functions of the NSC are handled by a staff headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The Under Secretaries Committee and the Defense Program Review Committee operate at a level just below the National Security Council. The Under Secretaries Committee considers matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.

The Defense Program Review Committee is a new body, established last year. This group considers major defense program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to over-all national priorities.

Many issues are acted upon by the committees at the highest level, leading to the National Security Council for a Presidential decision.

Membership on both of these groups consists of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers are also members of the Defense Program Review Committee. In addition, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President's Science Adviser, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission participate as appropriate.

Many issues are acted on by these committees. Unresolved problems and matters of particular significance are forwarded to the full National Security Council for a Presidential determination.

Serving as a secretariat and clearing house for these groups is the NSC review group. It is chaired by Dr. Kissinger and consists of representatives from State, Defense, CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Below this level are the various interdepartmental groups which are formed on a regional basis (for example, there is the Inter-Departmental Group for European Affairs). There are also NSC *ad hoc* committees which address special problems that cut across regional boundaries.

All of these groups have a broad representation which as-

sures that all sectors of the Executive Branch are contributing and communicating in policy matters.

Here is how the process works: the President assigns an issue for intensive study, asking for policy choices and the pros and cons of the different courses of action which evolve.

When a report is complete, it is examined by the NSC Review Group Provision is made to include dissenting views. The report then goes to either the Under Secretaries Committee, the Defense Program Review Committee or directly to the National Security Council.

There is also provision for policy implementation. Just as policies are shaped and programs formed through a constant process of interagency discussion and debate within the NSC framework, likewise is their implementation. The Under Secretaries Committee is tasked with the job of ensuring that policy directives are converted into action.

You will recognize the continuing nature of military advice to the national security system.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are kept informed of and contribute to policy matters at all levels of consideration in the national security system. Meeting several times each week, the Joint Chiefs are continually providing the military advice that aids in shaping final national policy. Subject matter covers the entire military-political spectrum: war plans, disarmament, base negotiations, international relations and national policy.

The Administration has also revised the planning, programming and budgeting system, the method by which we systematically plan the composition of our Armed Forces. The cycle starts with a definition of the strategy, proceeds to a determination of the forces necessary to achieve the strategy and is then followed by programming and budgeting for those forces.

The world has changed significantly during the past two decades. We now have stronger allies with sounder economics; an apparently less cohesive Communist world exists; many more nations are developing independently. As we look to the future, we define our national interests with concern for the legitimate interests of other nations, while recognizing that deep-seated differences among nations will continue.

Therefore, in the national security review, four overriding needs have been focused upon:

One—a fresh appraisal of the forces which pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.

Two—a realistic appraisal of the constraints—for example, the need to control inflation and reorder national priorities—within which our national objectives must be attained.

Three—new machinery, such as the revitalized National Security Council and the new Defense Program Review Committee, to deal effectively with national security problems within the complex structure of the government.

And finally—new national security policy, strategy, and plans which will realistically match our military capabilities to our national objectives, our available resources, and the threats to our national security interests.

Out of this has come the new "Strategy for Peace," the cornerstone of which is the Nixon Doctrine. It involves a prudent policy towards Asia and permits full recognition of our vital security interests in Europe. It already has brought about a reduction of the American military presence in Asia.

The President has emphasized that we will provide a shield for any of our allies whose freedom is threatened by a nuclear power, and a shield for any other nation whose survival we judge to be vital to our own security.

He has stated that we have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue is how to be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace.

He pledges faith to our treaty obligations, while at the same time looking to our allies to share more of the over-all defense burden in a more fruitful partnership with us.

The new strategy could have a major impact on the strategic forces of the future. How it will do so depends upon many factors, not the least being the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The President has affirmed that our strategic power will remain sufficient to protect our vital interests and those of our allies if threatened by a nuclear power. Since the United States bears the major costs of providing strategic forces, it is possible for our allies to shoulder more of the nonstrategic burden.

As to the implications of the new strategy on general purpose forces, the President had this to say:

"The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960s was the so-called '2½' principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency—all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.

"In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as a '1½' war strategy. Under it we will maintain in peace time general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in *either* Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."

This strategy has led to the conclusion that the United States must emphasize three fundamental premises for a sound defense policy:

First, while strategic forces must deter *all* threats of general war no matter what the cost, our general purpose forces must be more sensitively related to local situations and particular interests.

Second, while the United States has the primary responsibility for nuclear defense, the planning of general purpose forces must take into account our heavy expenditures for strategic forces and the fact that the manpower of our friends greatly exceeds our own.

Third, we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world. This is particularly true of subversion and guerrilla warfare, or "wars of national liberation."

Through the national security system the President weighs all factors which must contribute to the national economy and national security. A sound economy and adequate security are mutually interdependent—we cannot have one without the other. We must have both for national survival and well being.

I am confident that the combination of thorough planning, sound decisions and full understanding by informed citizens will continue to give our nation the momentum it needs to maintain its greatness in the debate ahead.

Junior ROTC Program Reaches Its Highest Level

The Junior Reserve Officer Training (ROTC) program has reached a high point in its 54 year history. More than 140,000 pupils in 782 secondary schools across the country are now actively engaged in the program, according to Dr. George C. S. Benson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education.

Graduates of Junior ROTC receive credit for the first year of senior ROTC if they go on to college, or advanced promotion if they enlist in the Armed Forces.

Graduates who do not enter college are more likely to enlist in some branch of the service than their high school counterparts, according to Dr. Benson. They are also more apt to continue beyond the first term.

Aside from encouraging young people to consider military careers at both officer and noncom levels, the Junior ROTC program offers basic citizenship training.

"We have had a number of high school principals tell us that the program helps citizenship generally," Dr. Benson said. "The Junior ROTC seems to fill an especially useful place in schools . . . It gives the cadets . . . something to be proud of. They seem to wear the uniform with pride."

The history of Junior ROTC dates to 1916 when the National Defense Act provided a junior course for non-collegiate military schools, high schools and other preparatory schools. In 1964, escalating costs prompted the Defense Department to suggest replacing the program with the National Defense Cadet Corps—a program with similar objectives.

A hue and cry from educators and citizens convinced Congress that the Junior program was in the national interests. Advocates claimed the program "had a salutory effect on juvenile delinquency," and "helped to produce potential leaders."

Air Force Major Charles L. Hyland, Dr. Benson's assistant, points out that the program does "provide students with the opportunity to share leadership experiences that they would not normally have."

The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 allowed an ultimate expansion of Junior ROTC to 1,200 units. To be eligible for an ROTC unit, a school must show an ability to maintain an enrollment of 100 male students who are citizens of the United States and at least 14 years of age.

A provision to employ retired military personnel as instructors was introduced to hold down costs and manpower ceilings. Retired people are hired by the school and paid the difference between their retired pay and their normal active duty rate. The school shares this cost with the military service.

Classrooms, storage and drill areas are supplied by the school; the service contributes texts, equipment and uniforms. Of the 782 units currently in existence, the Army operates by far the greatest number, 538 units. The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have, respectively, 144, 79 and 22 units in operations.

11 States Will Hold Primaries In June

Eleven States will hold primary elections in June to select candidates for general elections Nov. 3.

Primaries in California, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, and South Dakota will be June 2; New Mexico June 3; South Carolina June 9; Maine June 15; and Delaware and New York June 16.

New York and Delaware, however, prohibit absentee voting in primary elections but permit qualified Armed Forces voters and their spouses and dependents to vote by absentee ballot in the November general elections. The Federal Post Card Application may be used to obtain a ballot.

DoD's Project 100,000 Reduces Reliance On Draft

(Continued From Page Three)

have a fairly high success rate, and take in numbers we feel the Services can use."

It was emphasized that the program is not being conducted "as an open end social program." The Services are not taking in extra men just to serve as a "social welfare institution," but men the Services can use, it is believed. Project 100,000 has as an objective the improvement of the competence of disadvantaged youth, and this important social goal is being performed as a by-product of military service.

"As could be expected," a report issued by Mr. Kelley's office said, "the men brought in under reduced mental standards do not perform as well as a cross section of men with higher test scores and educational abilities. This is true on all measures—training attrition, promotions, supervisory ratings, disciplinary record and attrition from service. The differences are not large," he said, "and we feel they are acceptable when balanced against the military and social goals of the program."

The characteristics and performance of the medically remedial men are comparable to those of a cross section of servicemen. They are all volunteers. Their medical conditions would normally bar them from being subject to the draft.

I. M. Greenberg, Director of Project 100,000, does not see these men as being "unique" in the Armed Forces. "We have had standards as low, in fact a little lower in WWII and Korea, than they are now. The military services have had considerable experience in the training and utilization of men who score low on the armed forces qualification test."

He explained that beginning in 1958 the Armed Forces began raising entrance standards and ended up excluding men who scored poorly on their entrance exams.

Today, he said, we have lowered standards but are still exercising a certain degree of selectivity. About 10 per cent still fail to meet our current mental standards.

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